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Abstract
hrough the case study of a 90,000-acre section of forest called the Mazama Tree Farm
(Mazama), this manuscript explores several dynamics within the State of Jefferson,
notably (1) the changing power of Native American tribes relative to other landowners and (2)
the transition in rural land uses from productivism toward post-productivism. The Mazama was
part of the Klamath Reservation until tribal termination in 1954, when it was purchased by an
industrial landowner. The loss of the reservation coincided with the nadir of tribal power
within the State of Jefferson, but more recent developments may return the Mazama to tribal
ownership as a result of renewed tribal power and the diminishing role of industrial forestry in
the region.

T

Introduction
This paper presents the history and the social dynamics surrounding land use and forestry on the
former Klamath Reservation, and in particular a 90,000-acre section of forest, the Mazama Tree
Farm (Mazama). It considers ownership and management of the Mazama from the Klamath
Tribes1 (Tribes) to forest industry to possible reacquisition by the Tribes, and in so doing offers
a window into several dynamics at work in the State of Jefferson. These are (1) the changing
power of Native American tribes relative to other landowners and (2) the transition in rural land
uses from productivism toward post-productivism as it is occurring in the American West.
This case study research focuses on forests in the Klamath Basin, a region stretching
from south-central Oregon into northern California. Most of these forests were historically
dominated by large ponderosa pine with frequent, low-intensity fire regimes that “cleaned out”
the understory (Youngblood et al., 2004). In contrast, the predominant tree species of the
Mazama today is lodgepole pine, an economically less-valuable species than ponderosa pine
1

Though often referred to as the Klamath Tribe, they are three tribes, hence the modern name the Klamath Tribes.
Another term, the Klamaths, is frequently used in tribal documents. For this research, we have chosen to refer to
the tribes as the Klamath Tribes.
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that occurs in topographic depressions, or as subordinate species under ponderosa pine stands
(ODF, 2009a). Geographically, the Mazama lies at the northwestern edge of the former
Klamath Reservation, which was at the northern edge of the Klamath Basin (see Figure 1).
This paper does not seek to represent the experiences of all tribes in the State of
Jefferson, or to tell the complete story of the Klamath Tribes. Rather, it relates a piece of tribal
history in the State of Jefferson and links tribal sovereignty and power with control over a land
base. It begins with a literature review of (1) tribal power and (2) rural land uses, focusing on
forestry, and then outlines the history of the Tribes and their land base, from the arrival of EuroAmerican settlers. It provides a brief overview of recent disputes that may lead to tribal
reacquisition of the Mazama as a result of complex negotiations surrounding water allocation,
dam removal, and endangered species protection. It also considers the links between tribal
power and land ownership, as well as the possibilities for further tribal land acquisitions across
the US.

Figure 1. Map of the Klamath Reservation, with its 1954 boundaries, the Mazama Tree Farm,
and the Klamath Basin. The reservation was located within Klamath County, one of several
counties in Oregon and California in the Klamath River Basin (boundary data from the Klamath
Tribes; map by Erin Kelly).
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The Arc of Tribal Power
The relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government is grounded in the
federal trust responsibility toward tribes, which includes the protection of tribal lands and
resources (Wood, 1995). The trust responsibility was established through treaties in which
tribes ceded lands in return for federal protection and retention of tribal rights over remaining
lands (Chambers, 1975).
But the federal government largely violated its trust responsibility for decades, often
through breaching treaty rights but also through the creation of laws that deprived tribes of land
or resources. One example is the Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, which divided commonly
held reservation lands into individual, privately-owned 160-acre parcels. The policy was
reminiscent of the 1862 Homestead Act in its attempt to create a landscape of small-scale
agrarian farmers, but its effect was to break apart Indian lands and thus break up Indian tribes.
In the words of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the time,
It has become the settled policy of the Government to break up reservations,
destroy tribal relations, settle Indians upon their own homesteads, incorporate
them into national life, and deal with them not as nations or tribes or bands, but as
individual citizens. (Morgan, 1890)
The Allotment Act resulted in the loss of 90 million acres from tribal ownership across the
country (US Congress, 2000).
Another example was provided by the termination policies of the 1940s and 1950s,
which completely dissolved the federal trust relationship and the land base of terminated tribes.
Federal legislators established policies to terminate recognition of Indian tribes in order to end
federal supervision and assimilate Indians into mainstream culture (Getches et al., 2005). In
1970, President Richard Nixon acknowledged that termination policies were a failure; in 1975
the Indian Self-Determination Act ended termination policies, and the era of “selfdetermination” was established, replacing the assimilationist policies that had proven
detrimental to tribes and signaling a shift in government policy toward respecting tribal rights
(Wood, 1995; Rasmussen et al., 2007). Tribes since that time have successfully asserted claims
over trust resources and land by drawing on powers granted to them through treaties, judicial
decisions, and agreements (Wilkinson, 2005). The Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (PL
97-459) and its amendments addressed the fractionation of Indian lands as land ownership
passed through inheritance to large numbers of heirs, in order to “consolidate fractional
interests [in land] in a manner that enhances tribal sovereignty…and reverse the effects of the
allotment policy” (25 USC 2201 §102).
Tribal power thus has long been linked with land ownership and US government
policies that have eroded tribal land ownership have also eroded tribal power. Power here is
viewed as the ability of actors to influence political and economic outcomes—not only to
identify problems and propose solutions, but also to set the “rules of the game” (Takeda &
Ropke, 2010). The tribal land base for tribes is tied to the economic vitality and capacity of the
tribes, along with the health of tribal government and culture:
The land base provides a place of habitation for present and future generations of
a tribe, marks the jurisdiction within which tribal government operates, supplies
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the reservation economy, and provides a sacred place for time-honored cultural
traditions. (Wood, 1995, p. 740)
While growing tribal power has invigorated tribal claims to traditional lands, funding
mechanisms have also grown to enable tribes to purchase lands. In 2001, the Indian Tribal Land
Acquisition Program, created under the Farm Bill, began to provide loans to tribes for land
acquisition. In the Pacific Northwest, one of the largest and most important sources of funding
has been the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The BPA dammed the Columbia and
Snake rivers in the Pacific Northwest, severely degrading tribal trust resources, in particular the
salmon runs on those rivers. In the 1990s, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation received mitigation funds from the BPA to purchase two parcels along the
Columbia River totaling over 2,500 acres, and the Wallowa Band of the Nez Perce received
funds to purchase 10,000 acres.
In other cases, tribes have established land purchase programs that are self-funded, such
as the Yakama Nation Land Enterprise, established in 1950, which has purchased parcels within
its 2.4 million-acre reservation to consolidate ownership (Harvard Project, 2002). Should their
project succeed, the majority of funding for the purchase of the Mazama would come from the
federal government as a result of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement.
The Disintegration of Industrial Forestry and the “Post-Productive” Landscape
The trajectory of industrial forest land ownership—and its availability on the market—is
a key component of this story. For many years, industrial private timberland owners acquired
lands to supply their sawmills and other wood processing facilities. The industry was thus
integrated, with timberlands that supplied material to the mills held by forest industry (Yin et
al., 1998). But through the 1980s and 1990s, industrial forest companies accumulated debt as
they consolidated both timberland and mill ownership through mergers and acquisitions
(Roberts et al., 2004). To relieve the debt and improve returns to shareholders, many companies
divested their lands to new types of purchasers generally referred to as “timberland
investors” (Block & Sample, 2001; Fernholtz et al., 2007; Hagan et al., 2005; Clutter et al.,
2005).
The formerly industrial timberlands were primarily sold to a new category of timberland
owners, generally referred to as “timberland investors.” The transition was swift—the 10 largest
private timberland owners in the US in 1994 were all industrial owners (Yin et al., 1998), but
by 2006, eight of the 10 largest private timberland owners were timberland investors (Clutter,
2007). This change occurred as industry owners sold lands to reduce debt and as investors
“discovered” the value of timberlands for portfolio diversification. Multiple timberland
investment vehicles were created in order to distribute timberland profits, the most prominent
being Timberland Investment Management Organizations, Real Estate Investment Trusts, and
Master Limited Partnerships—all tax-advantaged, non-mill-owning entities that required profits
to be distributed to investors.
Timberland investors proved willing to sell the lands they purchased, particularly as the
lands were disintegrated from the mills. Timberland investors took hold of “undervalued”
timberlands and broke them up for higher and better use sales, often real estate or recreation
development (Wear & Newman, 2004), as rural areas shifted from commodity production to
recreation, real estate development, and the service industry. Timberland investors also sold to
other ownerships, including tribal ownerships and conservation ownerships such as land trusts.
In 2001, the Yakama Nation Land Enterprise purchased 28,000 acres from International Paper,
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an industrial forest company that was divesting its timberlands. Within the State of Jefferson,
the Yurok Tribe in northern California has acquired over 30,000 acres of land from Green
Diamond, an industrial forest company, with plans to purchase additional acres.
This disintegration and breakup of the forest industry estate can be considered through
the lens of post-productivism, a concept that originated in the United Kingdom. Productivist
rural land uses are characterized by intensive and standardized land management focused on
maximizing commodity production, corporate or centralized control, and consolidation of
ownership (Wilson, 2007). In contrast, as a result of in-migration of urban residents, along with
changing rural economies and environmental policies, many rural areas are now characterized
by post-productive land uses (Marsden et al., 1993; Wilson, 2007). Post-productivism in
forestry includes the breakup of many forest lands by “amenity buyers” who purchase lands for
viewshed or recreation purposes (Gosnell & Abrams, 2009), and a shift in management from
maximizing timber production to a broader suite of goals, including restoration of ecosystem
processes, habitat creation, and recreation, along with wood production (Milbourne et al.,
2008). The breakup of the industrial forest estate is an expression of the post-productive
transition, especially as forest investors unlock land values through real estate and conservation
sales.
Productivist policies in the Klamath Basin favored commodity production of wood and
agricultural products, but these policies have been replaced through environmental legislation
and multiple lawsuits, contributing to more post-productive rural land uses, including the
diverse economic and social values of the Klamath Tribes.
Methods
This research utilized a case study approach, which examines phenomena within their
real-life context (Yin, 2003). We conducted in-depth interviews with 14 people affiliated with
the purchase of the Mazama or its management, and 10 additional interviews with local
ranchers. We also accessed documents pertaining to the history of the tribes and the
management of the Mazama from US Forest Service offices and libraries in the region.
The Klamath Reservation
Though the history of the tribes in the Klamath Basin extends thousands of years, this story
begins with the arrival of Euro-American settlers and the establishment of the Klamath Tribes
under the 1864 Treaty, which bound three tribes—the Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin band of
the Snake (Paiute)—to the Klamath Reservation. The Tribes forfeited approximately 20 million
acres of their homelands for a reservation of 2 million acres, but subsequent federal and state
policies cumulatively undermined tribal power and the reservation was fragmented through a
series of legal and procedural decisions. Fragmentation initially occurred through the 1887
Allotment Act, when about 25% of the initial reservation was allotted to individual members
and about half of these lands were then sold to nontribal members (Tonsfeldt, 1980). The
reservation was further eroded through errors in two separate federal surveys, in 1871 and 1888,
which excluded 600,000 acres from the reservation. In 1906, 85,000 acres were carved from the
reservation and sold to industrial forest interests (Doremus & Tarlock, 2008).
As the reservation and tribal power diminished, policies and projects favoring EuroAmerican settlement set the stage for the ecological and economic transformation of the
surrounding Klamath Basin. In 1906, the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) began its enormous
Klamath Irrigation Project, building dams and canals to convert the Klamath Basin into a
landscape suitable for irrigated agriculture. This also established the productivist agricultural
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model within the Klamath Basin. Forestry and agriculture formed the backbone of the
productivist transformation of the Basin, characterized by harvest of the largest ponderosa pine,
fire exclusion, extensive wetland fill, water diversion for agricultural purposes, and dam
construction.
Forestry in Klamath County
Settlers and industrial forest companies established a thriving forest industry in Klamath
County after the arrival of the Southern Pacific Railroad in 1909 (Stern, 1965). The Klamath
Reservation provided a great deal of timber for the industry—from 1909-1929, the majority of
Klamath County timber was cut from either public national forests or Indian lands (Bowden,
2002), and even after the arrival of several large industrial timberland owners, tribal harvests
remained central to the industry.
Few Klamath tribal members were employed in the forest industry, but all tribal
members received a per-capita disbursement from timber sales. The per-capita timber payment,
$800 by the 1950s, put tribal incomes on par with nontribal Klamath County residents (Hood,
1972; Trulove & Bunting, 1971). While tribal members received timber payments, forest
management was controlled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), in a paternalistic
relationship against which many tribal members struggled while traditional livelihoods were
displaced. Forest managers selectively harvested the largest ponderosa pine out of the forests,
changing the structure of the forests significantly, and they discontinued traditional fire
management that had been used to clear undergrowth and had facilitated hunting and the
propagation of culturally significant plant species. According to one tribal member,
When the European comes and cleans these canopies and all this undergrowth is
growing, and the tribes are trying to burn, they say wait a minute, what are you
doing? Fire is bad…we’re never consulted on anything. Well, now we are, but
during the time that it meant something—because you’re never going to see this
old growth timber back…the tribes, [went] from a strong nation—first singular
management, then forest co-management, then no management by a conquering
race and to be made to sit back and watch it happen, to be victims of it happening.
(Interview, tribal member)
Management was predicated on maximizing timber for the mills of the county,
which were located off the reservation. The Klamath Reservation was therefore a fiber
farm for the forest industry of the region, and the Klamath Tribes had little control over the
management of their forest resources.
Termination
In 1954, the Klamath Tribes were among the first tribes in the US to be recommended
for termination, which ended federal supervision and entitlements and dissolved tribal
ownership of reservation lands, ostensibly to help integrate tribal members into the mainstream
US economy. The Klamath Tribes were recommended for termination because of their financial
and material success, paradoxically based on the forest resources of their reservation (Hood,
1972). Klamath tribal members received $43,000 each2 in 1961 as a result of the sale of their
2

Klamath tribal members could not vote on termination—only whether to withdraw from the tribe in exchange for
a cash payment, or become “remaining members” with a collective interest in a privately-administered parcel of
land which was dissolved in 1973. In the vote, 1,659 members withdrew and 473 remained. Withdrawing
members received payment in 1961 while remaining members received payment in 1973.
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reservation, but as of 1965, 80% had less than half their money left, and 40% had nothing left
(Trulove & Bunting, 1971). Termination resulted in poverty and a disconnection between tribal
members and their land, as on tribal member attests:
By us not feeling a connection to that land, which we felt for thousands and
thousands of years, it had a negative impact on us…it left us a fractured, lost,
disconnected people. (Interview, tribal member)
While Indian wellbeing was used to justify termination, most Congressional hearings
about Klamath termination centered on the 890,000-acre Klamath Reservation and the
reallocation of its timber resources (Hood, 1972). At the time of termination, the reservation
contained 24% of remaining large timber in the Klamath Basin and the timber industry
represented 40% of the Basin’s economic activity (Wilcox, 1956). About 4.6 billion board feet
of virgin timber had been harvested from the reservation, with 4.2 billion board feet remaining
(Neuberger, 1959). Forest management followed sustained yield policies established by
progressive-era forest managers, which ensured a steady flow of timber for local mills
(Tonsfeldt, 1980), and legislators were largely concerned with fears of “abandonment of
sustained yield management practices presently enforced by the Federal Government” (quote
from the Secretary of the Interior, in Wilcox, 1956, p. 3). The private sale of reservation
timberland would have resulted in a surge of timber supply and an accompanying boom in
sawmill infrastructure (Wilcox, 1956), and US Senator Richard Neuberger of Oregon responded
to concerns of Klamath Falls sawmill owner L. L. Shaw that “surely no one wants to see a
boom community followed by the blight that would settle over the entire community once the
timber resources were gone” (Neuberger, 1955, p. 1).
Because of these concerns over (nontribal) community and industry stability, the bulk of
the former reservation was purchased by the US government for the national forest system.
Several timbered pieces of the reservation were offered for sale in large (>5,000-acre) blocks to
industrial forest operators with sustained-yield management requirements (Neuberger, 1959).
Sustained-yield management was defined as a “forest well-balanced by diameter or age classes
and capable of continuously producing [timber]” (USFS, 1959, p. 2), and prospective buyers
were required to create 10-year management plans and inventories ensuring sustained-yield
practices, to be monitored by the US Forest Service. Only one unit sold—the Mazama—which
was purchased by Crown Zellerbach, an industrial forest company.
Forest resources on the Mazama had somewhat limited economic utility—much of the
forest was dominated by small-diameter lodgepole suitable only for pulpwood, with little
ponderosa pine. Other units offered for sale had far more valuable timber resources than the
Mazama, but timberland buyers may have balked at the monitoring and sustained yield
requirements when ponderosa pine was still available on publicly-owned national forest lands,
which now included the remainder of the former reservation.
The 10-year management plans and inventories, and yearly USFS visits to the Mazama,
provide insight into private timberland management on the property.3 They reveal that forestry
on the Mazama was driven by immediate economic considerations of its owners, despite
sustained yield requirements and stated objectives of “improv[ing] the health and growing
capacity of both ponderosa and lodgepole stands” (Crown Zellerbach, 1980, p. 6).
3

All records from the Mazama were accessed at the Lakeview Ranger District in Lakeview, Oregon.
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The Mazama was officially to be managed for “rotations which recognize both value
and volume production” (Crown Zellerbach, 1970, p. 6), but merchantable ponderosa pine were
disproportionately targeted for harvest—over one third of the total ponderosa pine was cut in
the first 10-year cutting cycle, while only 19% of the predicted lodgepole pine harvest occurred
(Semmens, 1976). While total volumes were sustained, tree diameters declined as large
ponderosa pine were cut, resulting in crowded conditions and disease problems, a problem
noted by the US Forest Service during one of its inspections: “on-the-ground practice is to
remove the biggest and best quality trees. This can encourage infection and intensification of
mistletoe in the stands” (USFS, 1970, p. 2). Almost 9,000 acres of ponderosa pine stands
converted to lodgepole pine as the ponderosa were cut out and replaced by the lodgepole
understory (Crown Zellerbach, 1980).
Every 10-year plan stated that lodgepole pine markets would become available, which
would encourage lodgepole harvests, but these markets did not materialize. Lodgepole
proliferated in dense thickets, contributing to elevated wildfire risks. Crown Zellerbach
recognized that the Mazama was becoming degraded, but it was economically unviable to better
manage the small-diameter, low-value lodgepole pine.
The Mazama passed through a series of owners after Crown Zellerbach (see Figure 2),
though it always retained the sustained-yield and reporting requirements, as well as Forest
Service oversight. The first timberland investor in the region, Sir James Goldsmith, took control
of Crown Zellerbach in 1986 and renamed it Cavenham Forest Industries. He sold the property
to Hanson Natural Resources in 1991, in exchange for shares in a gold mine. In 1996, the
Mazama was purchased by Crown Pacific, an aggressive Portland-based private timber
investment vehicle that had been recently created and was expanding rapidly.

Figure 2. The ownership history of the Mazama Tree Farm from establishment in 1864 as part
of the Klamath Tribes Reservation through industrial ownership and timberland investor
ownership.
Crown Pacific’s revenue grew steadily through 2000, largely from sales of shares that
were used to purchase more land. Its debt grew apace with revenue, from $326 million in 1995
to a peak of $689 million in 2000, and the company declared bankruptcy in 2004.
After filing for bankruptcy, Crown Pacific’s timberlands came under the control of its
creditors, renamed Cascade Timberlands LLC. In 2006, one of the creditors (Fidelity National
Financial) purchased majority interest in Cascade Timberlands and immediately placed the
Mazama on the market. Cascade Timberlands subsequently agreed to work with the Klamath
Tribes on reacquisition:
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When we first bought Cascade is when I came across the Klamath Tribes…it was
always a priority of mine to find a way to get [the Tribes] the Mazama Tract.
(Interview, Fidelity executive)
The Fidelity executive explained that the land had little real estate or timber production
value, and the tribes were “the logical buyer.” This was at least in part because the forest
industry of the region was collapsing. National forest lands that neighbored the Mazama had
shifted to ecosystem management in the early 1990s in response to environmental litigation and
began to base management on sustaining ecosystem processes and biodiversity. This
contributed to an 89% decline in harvest levels in the county, from a high of over 600 million
board feet harvested in 1971 to 67 million board feet in 2008 (ODF, 2009b). As harvest levels
declined, mills closed and the timber industry contracted to levels barely sufficient to maintain
infrastructure, and forest industry employment fell about 70% from 1976 to 2008 (Oregon
Employment Department, 2009). Fidelity, which had no experience as a forest landowner, had
little interest in holding low-value timberland with sustained yield requirements located in a
region with uncertain timber demand.
Conflict and Leverage: The Mazama Enters the Water Wars
The Klamath Tribes had their tribal status restored in 1986, but no land was returned. In
the late 20th century, a complex and bitter water conflict in the Klamath River Basin created the
conditions for possible tribal land reacquisition. For most of the 20th century, water levels in the
Klamath River were dictated by irrigation needs or downstream river flows for hydroelectric
dams (Marbut, 2002). This arrangement was interrupted by shifting legal, political, and
ecological circumstances, described briefly below and also in Braunworth et al. (2002),
Doremus and Tarlock (2008), and Gosnell and Kelly (2010). Through a series of lawsuits, the
tribes of the Klamath Basin—the Klamath Tribes and also the tribes of northern California—
were recognized as holders of the oldest water rights in the basin (Doremus & Tarlock, 2008).
This gave them seniority over the irrigators and some power within the water adjudication
process. In 1988, two fish species, the Short-nosed sucker and Lost River sucker, both treaty
species for the Klamath Tribes, were listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act.
The suckers’ primary habitat was the Upper Klamath Lake and its reservoirs, “the same waters
BOR uses to control water flow to the irrigators of the Klamath Project” (McHenry, 2003, p.
1026).
Biological opinions for the sucker species (along with threatened Coho salmon) were
released in 2001, which recommended reducing Basin water allocations, and in April 2001 a
US District Court ruled that the Klamath Project was in violation of the Endangered Species
Act, halting irrigation flows altogether. Irrigators in the basin responded angrily, with thousands
participating in a symbolic “bucket brigade” that ended with the installation of a 10-foot bucket
in front of the Klamath Government Center. The US Secretary of the Interior flew to Klamath
Falls in 2002 to open the irrigation headgates in a show of solidarity with irrigators, but a
massive fish die-off followed reinstatement of irrigation flows (Lynch & Risley, 2003),
highlighting the results of disastrous water misallocation in the Basin.
As water conflicts persisted, the Klamath Tribes put together concrete plans for “the
return of the Tribes’ land base as an essential element of their restoration as a people” (Klamath
Tribes, 2008). From 2002, the Klamath Tribes developed plans for the reacquisition of the
700,000 acres of national forest lands that were former reservation lands. The Tribes contracted
three prominent forest scientists to write a forest management plan, titled A Plan for the
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Klamath Tribes’ Management of the Klamath Reservation Forest (Johnson et al., 2008). The
Johnson Plan, though written by nontribal members, was intended to give the Tribes control
over their former reservation lands, in part by outlining ways that the Tribes would manage
their forest resources.
The proposals for tribal reacquisition of the national forest lands were met with very
strong opposition from irrigators, and this first attempt at land return did not succeed. But soon
two conditions converged to give the Klamath Tribes an important opportunity at land
reacquisition: collaborative negotiations centered on the water conflict and the placement of the
Mazama on the market.
In 2004, when PacifiCorp, which owned the hydroelectric dams, filed for license
renewal, a series of formal monthly meetings were established under a collaborative
framework. This was an opportunity for a large number of groups, including tribal,
environmental, farming, fishing, and governmental, to discuss dam relicensing. From these
initial meetings, which focused narrowly on dam relicensing, grew the Klamath Settlement
Group, which had a more formidable task—to find an overarching agreement to resolve the
myriad water and natural resource problems in the Klamath Basin.
Within the Klamath Settlement Group negotiations, the reacquisition of the Mazama
became a primary goal of the Klamath Tribes. In January 2008, the Klamath Settlement Group
released the draft Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), a multifaceted waterallocation agreement that included funding for the purchase of the Mazama for the Klamath
Tribes.
The KBRA had vocal dissent from some irrigators who felt that they did not have a seat
at the table. Power had shifted in the Basin to favor some of the Tribes’ interests, even at the
expense of some irrigators (Gosnell & Kelly, 2010). Many irrigators explained their position as
a moral issue:
It seems that we have to litigate to defend what should be ours, like if you’ve been
using it for 120 years and nobody’s been complaining, maybe it’s a little too late
to complain now. So we think it’s unjust. (Interview, rancher and irrigator)
Despite significant opposition, the KBRA has remained the sole agreement to resolving
water issues in the Klamath Basin and the best chance for the Klamath Tribes’ reacquisition of
the Mazama. The Mazama would be purchased with funds from the Department of the Interior,
supplemented by funds raised by Trust for Public Land (TPL), a national non-profit assisting
the tribes with the land purchase.
Though the Johnson Plan (Johnson et al., 2008) was initially created for the national
forest lands of the former reservation, management on the Mazama would still be informed by
the Johnson Plan because it “covers the whole range of habitat types and
conditions” (Interview, tribal member). In lodgepole forests such as the Mazama, the plan calls
for “much lower densities and…stand mosaics of different ages and densities, rather than
extensive areas of dense, contiguous forests” (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 6). Specific prescriptions
include an acceleration of pre-commercial thinning, wherein small trees are removed in a young
stand to expedite the growth of remaining trees. The plan also prescribes rejuvenation of
bitterbrush understory for mule deer. This approach differs from industrial ownership:
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They [industry] go in, they harvest about 10 million board feet a year—they do
absolutely nothing else… That’s what’s been done on that property for 50 years.
So ours would be more intense management, with the idea of improving forest
health. (Interview, tribal member)
Reacquisition of the Mazama would also enable tribal access to management decisions
on neighboring national forest lands—which constitute most of the former reservation—
through tools like the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA, PL 108-278) of 2004. Under the
TFPA, tribes submit management proposals to the Secretary of Agriculture for federal lands,
and approval is based on a number of criteria, including tribal ownership of neighboring land
and a relationship between the federal land and “circumstance[s] unique to that Indian tribe,”
such as treaty rights and biological or historical circumstances (PL 108-278 §2(c)(4)). The
TFPA is meant to allow Tribes to propose projects “that would protect their rights, lands, and
resources by reducing threats from wildfire, insects, and disease” (Intertribal Timber Council,
2013, p. 1).
Conclusion
The case of the Mazama provides insight into tribal power and its relationship to land
ownership, the role of tribes in post-productive landscapes of the US, and changing forest
management that incorporates multiple objectives, including tribal.
Tribal Power and Land Reacquisition
The history of the Klamath Tribes exposes the links between loss of power and loss of
land, as the Tribes were displaced and consolidated onto a reservation that was subsequently
dismantled through allotment and finally termination. Steps taken by the Tribes to reacquire
traditional lands like the Mazama reflect the recovery of tribal power in the era of selfdetermination and concrete plans to grow the tribal economy and culture around their land base.
The possible reacquisition of the Mazama under the KBRA demonstrates that tribal
treaty rights can be leveraged in circumstances such as the water disputes of the Klamath Basin.
In this case, Tribes earned a powerful negotiating position and an important seat at the table
with other actors in a complex deal; they also demonstrated the ability to raise funds and the
capacity to establish themselves as able managers of a large land base. This case outlines one
example of tribal involvement in natural resource negotiations, a process that has been repeated
across the US and Canada as tribes have become active participants in negotiated agreements
on their traditional lands (e.g., O’Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2005; Desbiens, 2004; Waage,
2001). Tribes in the US have been particularly successful at asserting their right to participate in
natural resource management as they draw on powers reserved through the federal-tribal trust
relationship (Doremus & Tarlock, 2008; Wilkinson, 2005).
Post-Productivism in the US: The Role of Tribal Lands
This powerful position of many tribes, and their willingness and ability to manage
traditional lands, has contributed to the American expression of post-productivism in rural
areas. Similar to Australia, where the creation of new forms of aboriginal title has resulted in
land transfers, particularly on marginal lands (Holmes, 2010), the American multifunctional
transition includes tribal ownership on a large scale. The European vision of post-productivism
includes many small-scale land holders (e.g. Wilson, 2007), but in the American West, postproductivism may include very extensive landholdings, and even consolidation of land, as
under tribal land reacquisition. But post-productivism in the US is characterized by a trend
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toward multiple and diverse uses of land and a shift away from commodity production. This
includes changed federal land policies in the wake of Endangered Species Act decisions and the
implementation of ecosystem-based management.
Post-productivism in the American West includes the renewal of tribal ownership and
tribal input into public land management, as under the TFPA. It also may include the
introduction of tribal knowledge, often termed Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) into
management on lands that have long excluded tribal views. Whereas the Klamath Tribes had a
reservation for many years, they were restricted by the BIA in their ability to directly manage
their own natural resources, including forest resources. The reacquisition of the Mazama would
not only restore a part of the former reservation, it would provide the Tribes with more land
management input than was granted in the early 20th century, when forest management was
transformed from supporting tribal uses to supporting a growing timber industry in the region.
Land management on the Mazama could include a diverse array of uses reflecting the
multiple values of post-productivism: conservation objectives, often informed by western
science, cultural objectives informed by TEK, and economic objectives including timber
harvesting. While the claims of the tribes are linked to historical treaty rights, the future of the
Mazama is grounded not only in a return to some historical state of ownership and
management, but also in restoration and future economic opportunities.
Changing Forest Management: Resilience and the Role of TEK
The incorporation of western scientific and traditional knowledge is demonstrated
through the Johnson Plan, which shifted primary management goals from maximizing timber
revenue to emphases on habitat creation and heterogeneous forest structure. The Johnson Plan
also advocated the reintegration of natural disturbances, especially fire, in recognition of the
important role of fire in historical tribal land management. The integration of traditional and
scientific knowledge is a kind of “participatory science” that arises with demands from
indigenous people to participate in decision-making (Berkes et al., 2001).
The Mazama may help demonstrate the compatibility of western scientific and
traditional ecological knowledge. This is not only because of the elevation of TEK as a
recognized and legitimate form of knowledge, but also as a result of changing views among
researchers regarding forest management based on principles of resilience and “ecosystembased management,” including the reintroduction of disturbance processes such as fire through
management (Grumbine, 1994; Puettman et al., 2008). Tribes, as owners, can turn to
mainstream forest science to inform their management, and in turn some managers and
researchers have begun to access and utilize indigenous knowledge (Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000).
The Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin, for example, has worked to combine scientific forest
management with a cultural land ethic (Pecore, 1992, p. 15; Berkes, 1999). Both western
scientific and TEK are empirical and may be viewed as complementary: western science
emphasizes generalized knowledge, and indigenous knowledge, or TEK, offers a “depth of
experience in a local context” (Becker & Ghimire, 2003; Kimmerer, 2002).
Land Availability in the Wake of Forest Industry Disintegration
The Tribes utilized their powerful position to help set the terms of the KBRA, but they
also acted opportunistically when the Mazama became available as a result of industrial
disintegration and the shrinking forest industry.
The opportunity for tribal reacquisition of forest lands may continue to expand as
timberland investors look for the highest value of the land, in some cases generated through
sales to tribes. Non-profit organizations, such as the California-based Native American Land
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Conservancy, established in 1998, and the nationwide Indian Land Tenure Foundation,
established in 2001, are providing grants for small-scale land acquisition. The Trust for Public
Land, which worked with the Klamath Tribes, has recognized the opportunity for large-scale
land reacquisition, as stated by an employee of TPL who said that “[forest industry
restructuring] is the best opportunity in a long time for tribes to get land back” (Interview, TPL
employee).
While the reacquisition of the Mazama is unusual because of its scale, more land
purchase opportunities are on the horizon as new forest investors seek returns from multiple
sources, including land sales to alternative ownerships such as tribes (Bliss et al., 2010). Tribes
may particularly benefit from this breakup of the industrial forest tenure, as they have a
commitment to purchase lands grounded in legal, moral, economic, cultural, and identity-based
claims (Hibbard & Lane, 2004). Particularly in the case of degraded timberlands, and in regions
with disappearing forest industry infrastructure, tribes may have an unprecedented opportunity
to purchase historical lands.
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